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ABSTRACT 
Two contrasting interpretations of the interrelation between politics and anthropology have 
co-existed in recent literature. On the one hand, the social sciences have freed themselves al-
most completely from the idea that there is a basic nature common to all human beings. After 
the “cultural turn” within these disciplines, they took it for granted that immediate access to 
facts is methodologically impossible, including facts about the purported nature of human 
beings. On the other hand, the past century was triumphal procession of evolutionary sci-
ences. These disciplines unquestionably shed light on the biological species homo sapiens. This 
essay defends neither of these two extreme positions, but looks for possibilities of updating the 
traditional synthetic view that is based upon an interrelation of natural and political sciences. 
To do so, it focuses on two questions. What do evolutionary sciences tell us about human be-
ings and about the development of culture? What practical consequences can we draw from 
this for political philosophy? Answering these questions calls for a discussion of the work of 
Darwin, Gehlen, von Hayek, Diamond, Burkert and others. 
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1. Political philosophy for a special animal 
 
All discourse on, and analysis of, human society has as its prerequisite some con-
cept, simple or complex, of what it is to be a human being. Sociology, political 
theory and political philosophy require anthropology. Our understanding of our-
selves relates directly to the way we wish to live – and to the set-up of our social 
world. According to Plato, for example, the human being is capable of ultimate 
insight, of grasping truth. This human capability can, however, be easily con-
strained by any number of human motives which cloud the perception of truth. 
This is the reason why Plato places education so centrally in the constitution of 
his polis. He recommends, among other things, that the citizens of the polis 
should grow up without knowing their own families (their parents and siblings). 
According to Plato, strong familial bonds lead people to think of their own par-
                                                          
1 I am grateful to Joachim Fischer, Fabian Geier, and Christian Thies for their helpful re-
marks. A German version of this text appeared as Illies 2009. 
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ticular interests as more important than the public good. Two thousand years 
later, Thomas Hobbes can characterize human beings by their fear of death. In 
Hobbes’ analysis, a powerful state, governed by a powerful leader, is the only 
thing which will grant the sense of security necessary for the cohesion of a soci-
ety of human beings. Therefore it is, according to Hobbes, in everyone’s self-
interest to subordinate one’s own needs to the needs of the state. Rousseau, by 
contrast, holds the opposite opinion. He sees a strong relationship between mis-
anthropy and an almost unlimited confidence in human nature: “Men are evil — 
melancholy and continuous experience removes the need for proof. However, 
man is naturally good.”2 For Rousseau social constraints are the primary source 
of the corruption of human nature. These constraints, he claims, are the cause of 
human hatreds and “all imaginable bad things.”3 
Despite differences of detail, all the above thinkers have one thing in com-
mon: they assume that taking the natural state of the human being as funda-
mental to socio-political order will result in the greatest good. Given this, Politi-
cal Philosophy has the task of understanding how human beings naturally be-
have. Furthermore, politics must seek ways of controlling and moderating the 
unsocial aspects of human nature, and of encouraging and promoting the social. 
There was a fundamental change in the methodology of Political Philosophy 
at the end of the twentieth century. From then until now two opposed interpre-
tations of the interrelation between politics and anthropology have co-existed:  
 
1) The social sciences have freed themselves almost completely from the idea 
that there is a basic nature common to all human beings. After the “cultural 
turn” within these disciplines, they took it for granted that immediate access to 
facts is methodologically impossible, including facts about the purported nature 
of human beings. Scientific theories are understood as a kind of “symbolic orders 
which have been produced by social processes and lead to ultimately contingent 
interpretations.”4 These systems of orders do not explain human nature. Social 
scientists use them instead to construct a picture of the human being as a con-
struction from nothing. One well-known example of such use is that of Judith 
Butler. According to her, both our gender and our sexual identity are – like any 
other binary system relating to the dichotomy between male and female – 
merely a cultural construct without any biological foundation.5 One might speak 
here of “culturalism” 6 . Culturalism is an idea common to such diverse ap-
proaches as gender studies, structuralism, Foucaultian discourse analysis, decon-
                                                          
2 Rousseau 1755 
3 Ibid.  
4 Cf. Reckwitz 2006, 24.  
5 Butler 1993. 
6 See the pointedly illustration in Fischer 2005. 
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structivism, and constructivism. It presupposes that there is no immediate ac-
cess to knowledge of human nature, and that all so called “insights” regarding 
human nature are merely cultural products. According to these approaches, any 
claim to a definitive analysis of human nature is naive and must therefore be re-
futed. This has important consequences for the interpretation of biology as a 
natural science: According to culturalism, biology creates its own subject — bi-
ology only remains a “discourse of power which creates an illusion of objectivity, 
but which inheres its own contingency.” 
 
2) On the other hand, one might choose to understand the twentieth century 
as a triumphal procession of evolutionary sciences. These disciplines unques-
tionably shed light on the biological species homo sapiens. After Darwin had 
cleared the way for evolution-oriented behavioural research (on the model of 
anatomical and morphological research) it was common to use evolutionary 
models to account for the ways we behave, feel, and even think. Classical ethol-
ogy, and later socio-biology and, even more recently, evolutionary psychology 
together came to new insights and made the bold claim that nature puts a short 
leash on the human being, that is, that the scope of possible behaviours is nar-
rowed severely through evolutionary pathways. 
 
As a consequence of these two different approaches, political theory and evo-
lutionary sciences became alienated from one another. One the one hand, every 
reference to “human nature” is vehemently rejected by political theorists. As 
Clifford Geertz puts it: “There is no human nature apart from culture.”7 This 
slogan had also a political dimension: Reference to nature was seen as a move by 
reactionary conservatives to justify inequality and to undermine emancipatory 
freedoms.8 On the other hand, evolutionary scientists point to a growing loss of 
reality within the (culturalistic) social sciences. For natural scientists it is prob-
lematic that socially relevant disciplines still do not acknowledge the results of 
empirical research. Some scientists even claim that social sciences should be re-
constituted on evolutionary grounds. As Robert Trivers suggests, disciplines 
such as “political sciences, law, economics, psychology, and anthropology” 
                                                          
 7 Geertz 1973, 35.  
 8 Obviously, political dimensions are more complex. European conservatives often used recent 
results of behavioural biology to show invariable human properties and a constant social be-
haviour. But in the United States, the majority of conservatives refused Darwinism since it 
threatened their religious beliefs. “Many conservatives, it seems, find the Darwinian account 
of human nature at best useless and at worst pernicious“ (cf. Holloway 2006, 7). However, in 
recent years, there were many conservative theorists in the U.S. referring to Darwin, whereas 
European socialists nowadays do not shy away from evolutionary arguments neither. 
The Relevance of Anthropology and the Evolutionary Sciences for Political Philosophy 
 
635 
 
should all become “branches of sociobiology.”9 
In the following, I will defend neither of the two extreme positions but will 
look for possibilities of updating the traditional synthetic view that is based 
upon an interrelation of natural and political sciences. To do so, I will focus on 
two questions: 
 
- What do evolutionary sciences tell us about human beings and 
about the development of culture? 
- What practical consequences can we draw from this for political phi-
losophy? (How can, for example, we make use of the knowledge of biological 
anthropology and evolutionary theory when conceiving prudent political 
structures and institutions?) 
 
The first question will be discussed in the following section (Section 2) in 
which a thumb-nail sketch of the human being as interpreted by biology will be 
presented. After that, the consequences of this picture for political philosophy 
will be investigated (Section 3). 
 
 
2. Human nature and culture seen from an evolutionary perspective 
 
 
2.1. The human being as a creature of possibilities 
 
What can we learn about the nature of human beings from biology and evolu-
tionary theory?10 “Seeing a dog, a horse and a man yawn, makes me feel how 
much all animals are built on one structure”,11 wrote Darwin into his diary in 
1838. In 1859, in his On the Origin of Species, he made only a few vague com-
ments about human beings. But the evolutionary perspective obviously gives a 
new foundation for (biological) anthropology, and thus it is no surprise that a 
few years after the publication of the Origin, other authors came up with evolu-
tionary histories of the human animal: Thomas Henry Huxley, Ludwig Büchner, 
and Ernst Haeckel being but three examples.12 Darwin wrote his own anthropol-
ogy later: The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex was published in 
1871, and The Expressions of Emotion in Man and Animal in 1872. His method 
was to compare observations of human and animal behaviour.13  He found, for 
                                                          
9 Quoted from the German newspaper Die Zeit (Dossier Soziobiologie), July 29, 1978, 33.  
10 For a more detailed answer to this question, see Illies 2006, 120-155. 
11 Darwin, 1838. 
12 Huxley 1873; Büchner 1869; Haeckel 1875. 
13For Darwin’s methodology, see Hösle and Illies 1999, 85ff. 
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example, similarities in the expression of fear and submission. In both works 
Darwin raises topics which are still points of debate today. All of them share the 
premise that there exist biologically selected dispositions within human behav-
iour: for emotions and even for cognitive acts.  
Evolutionary biology has, in the last century, been honed by correcting two 
points within Darwin’s theory. Firstly, biologists discovered the mechanism of 
heredity (about which Darwin had no developed theory). Secondly, not the spe-
cies but the gene is now seen as the fundamental unit of selection. A property is 
selected because it gives a certain individual (plant or animal) advantages over 
its fellows of the same species. This is the only way the property can be distrib-
uted within a certain population. As a consequence, selection primarily takes 
place between genes which encode certain properties. Selection on the level of a 
group or species is second-order.14  
This does not change the validity of Darwin’s basic assumptions, which are 
still accepted by the majority of evolutionary biologists. Human beings natu-
rally have dispositions: emotions and ways of behaving and thinking. They were 
useful at a certain stage in our evolutionary history – for example in the age of 
hunter-gatherers – and therefore they have been positively selected (first for an 
individual and later for the whole species). We assume that these dispositions 
can be found in all human beings: they are part of the “genetic core” of the spe-
cies. Even if they are always integrated into culture, their generality does not 
allow for an explanation in purely cultural terms (at least, according to evolu-
tionary biologists). This does not mean that these dispositions are found equally 
pronounced in every single human being or that they always cause identical be-
haviour. Behaviour varies from case to case and depends also on the socio-
cultural environment in which the life of an individual develops. 
But which of these results are important for political theory? We can distin-
guish four areas, even if only roughly. We shall call the first area elementary life 
requirements. These requirements human beings and most animals have in com-
mon: we (as all animals) must eat and drink, be active and sleep, and reproduce. 
In addition, there are three groups of phenomena which, we would argue, have a 
genetic foundation: dispositions towards sociability (cooperation, strategic alli-
ances, altruism etc.), dispositions towards unsociability (aggression, defence 
against strangers, social ambition etc.) and dispositional beliefs, thoughts, and 
emotions. Jonathan Haidt calls these emotions “moral emotions” since they ei-
ther support social behaviour (including altruistic behaviour) or punish anti-
social behaviour.15 David Buss gives a more precise account which categorizes 
                                                          
14 For the possibility of group selection, Wilson 1995, Sober 2000. Vehement defenders of 
group selection of the human are Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richardson (1988). 
15 Haidt 2001 and 2003. 
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these feelings in to three groups, namely “respect for authority,” “a thirst for 
justice”, and “the evolution of care.”16 The last area is especially interesting since 
it not only touches on the socio-political, but also includes phenomena that seem 
to be over and above pure emotions. These include certain inborn patterns of 
thought, mainly relating to social crises which the individual experiences when 
dealing with other individuals, which might well be part of our genetic heritage. 
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby claim that we naturally think in categories of 
“social contract.”17 
It is likely that there are also genetic dispositions to normative structures – 
behavioural rules, norms, and values. Edward O. Wilson argues, along these 
same lines: “Precepts chosen by intuition based on emotion are primarily bio-
logical in origin and are likely to do no more than reinforce the primitive social 
arrangements. Such a morality is unconsciously shaped to give new rationaliza-
tions for the consecration of the group, the proselytizing role of altruism, and the 
defence of territory.”18 
A whole range of social behaviour seems to be determined (or at least influ-
enced) by natural dispositions. This, at the least, is what biological anthropology 
can tell us about human nature. This does not contradict the fact that the hu-
man being needs a cultural community for his full development. The human be-
ing is not able to flourish completely by virtue of these innate dispositions alone: 
without a cultural community, his dispositions cannot be manifested. Further-
more, specific cultural frameworks play decisive roles when it comes to the ques-
tion of how these dispositions are to be developed. What, for example, does social 
standing mean? How does one attain to it in, for example, wrestling, singing, or 
a successful professional career? What status symbols mark it? These questions 
cannot be answered with reference purely to disposition alone: specific social set-
tings determine the expression of the disposition. “The dispositions influence the 
development of human behaviour rather by suggestions than by prescriptions” – 
as Hubert Markl puts it.19 From a biological point of view, the human being is 
primarily a creature of possibilities placed within a range of behaviour where the 
range is biologically bounded but the behaviours are culturally affected. 
 
2.2. Problems in biological anthropology 
 
There is much to support Darwin’s idea that the evolutionary history of Homo 
sapiens also includes behavioural dispositions. The literature of the last few dec-
ades adduces many examples of human beings displaying strong regularities and 
                                                          
16 Buss 2004, 388. 
17 Cosmides and Tooby 1992; see also Cosmides 1989. 
18 Wilson 1978, 167.  
19 Markl 1986, 86. 
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culturally independent patterns of behaving, feeling, or thinking; and there are 
various explanations of their selective advantages. But what does this tell us? 
How can this rule out the possibility that a regularity – even if it occurs in all 
human beings – is solely a cultural regularity? Statistical methods can make ge-
netic-disposition claims plausible, but can never prove them.20 One would need 
as a control group a number of individuals who grew up without any cultural 
framework; but such persons do not exist, and such a comparison is therefore 
impossible. Human development decisively relies on interactions with other hu-
man beings. Furthermore, most dispositions in which political philosophy is in-
terested relate to social action, i.e. behaviours enacted within a cultural frame-
work (even if this framework may be minimal). It is a methodological precondi-
tion that our actions are interwoven within a socio-cultural framework.21 
The analogy adduced by Darwin does not help here. Similar behaviour in 
animals and human beings can never be enough to give a positive proof of the 
existence of any disposition. For such a proof, one would need to show how cer-
tain genes encode proteins which build up a certain brain structure and thereby 
cause certain behaviours. At present no one can say when or whether biology 
will be able to demonstrate such details. 
Perhaps such a positive proof will never be forthcoming. Many critics as-
sume that human culture developed in so a short time that genetic selection of 
relevant dispositions was impossible.22 Also most dispositions (if they exist at all) 
are inherited poly-genetically, and this would make the whole concept of rival 
genes inapplicable. There is also the objection that many explanations for selec-
tive advantages are mere speculations and do not help in the understanding of 
the phenomena.23 
There is much biology would have to do in order to come up with a positive 
proof of genetic dispositions. One of the first steps biology would have to take is 
to articulate what actually might be grounded genetically. What does it mean to 
have a “disposition”? What exactly are we claiming if we, for example, assume 
                                                          
20 For an overview of objections against biological anthropology, see Kleeberg and Walter 
2001. 
21 However, one might try to observe the interaction between “natural” humans (i.e. humans 
growing up without any cultural frame), since such humans could not learn anything from 
anyone. But even this would not be enough for a proof in the strict sense: Firstly, most behav-
ioural patterns which are genetically disposed require a minimal ability of communication, 
and language can only be acquired within a cultural frame. Secondly, even the observation of 
“natural” humans does not methodically exclude the possibility that they might learn a cer-
tain behaviour, if only during process in which they are observed. 
22 For example Kleeberg and Walter 2001, 51f. But for the opposite opinion, see Lorenz 1974. 
23 Many critics say that sociobiology often re-describes already-known social phenomena with 
evolutionary terminology, but do not add anything to our understanding. Even Michael Ruse 
claims this rather snappishly in Philosophy of Biology Today, 1988, 66ff. 
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that human beings are nepotistic or reciprocal altruists by nature? Obviously 
this should mean that humans behave in certain situations in a particular way 
(which needs to be demonstrated by statistically significant evidence) and that 
the cause of this particular behaviour lies (at least partially) in biological struc-
tures. But actions are not properties like hair colour or the ability to roll the 
tongue. Actions are always the result of complex factors and procedures. 
Emotions may well have an important role in triggering action. Mark Ridley 
describes emotions as mediators between an inner calculator and outer behav-
iour.24 A disposition for altruism would then mean that we naturally have cer-
tain emotions, such as sympathy, which lead us into particular sets of relation-
ships (for example, when a relative is in need) which lead to altruistic actions. 
But this cannot be enough; when human beings act, the behaviour is not deter-
mined; for then it would not be an act. A person who feels vertigo when looking 
down from a great height, will shy away from a precipice in fear. This is not an 
act. When we act, we are not simply determined by an emotion – we decide to 
behave in a certain way (at least, that is what most of us believe). That is the 
reason why early ethologists stressed that human behaviour is not entirely con-
trolled by instincts (as they believed the behaviour of other animals was), but 
rather that human beings can and must always make decisions. Even if emotions 
mediate between the inner calculator and behaviour, one would need to clarify 
the complex role of reflection (or of the human will). One might agree with Ste-
ven Pinker when he claims that the expressions “kin-directed” and “reciprocal 
altruism” (and we might add: the dispositions towards them) are a “behaviourist 
short-hand for a set of thoughts and emotions”.25 But we also need to clarify 
what is meant by those “thoughts”. 
This whole interrelation is barely understood — and as long as there are no 
plausible theories purporting to explain it, all theories of natural behavioural 
dispositions remain incomplete. This general problem is brought to the fore by 
various attempts to supply a conceptual analysis of “dispositions” which would 
make the explanandum more precise. What is it that could be genetically deter-
mined? Konrad Lorenz speaks about “inherited coordinates” (Erbkoordinaten) or 
“instincts”. Recent ethologists speak instead of “innate behaviour.” Edward O. 
Wilson postulates natural “epigenetic rules,”26 and other evolutionary biologists 
rather vaguely claim that there are “internal desires, emotions and lustfulness.”27 
Should these considerable problems lead us to the conclusion that political 
theory should take the possibility of genetic behaviour dispositions with a pinch 
of salt? No. The hypothesis that such dispositions exist is still a plausible expla-
                                                          
24 Ridley 1996, 193. 
25 Pinker 1999, 403, my emphasis. 
26 See Lumsden and Wilson 1980. 
27 Hubert Markl, quoted by Voland 1999. 
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nation for the fact that certain behaviour and phenomena are culturally invari-
ant. This holds even though there is no positive proof of such genetic disposition 
and all such dispositional theory needs to be spelled out more precisely. The hy-
pothesis is plausible for two reasons. Firstly, it is consistent with many other in-
sights in evolutionary biology and in other related disciplines (such as neurobiol-
ogy). Secondly, we do not have any other plausible explanation. If – as many 
contemporary political theorists argue – statistically significantly behavioural 
patterns were merely cultural phenomena, it is rather puzzling as to why they oc-
cur within all or very many cultures.28 It is therefore, I believe, fruitful to pursue 
my initial question concerning the ramifications of the evolutionary sciences on 
the notion of human nature, even if the results of these sciences must still be re-
garded as speculations. 
 
2.3. Anthropological Foundations of Socio-Cultural Phenomena 
 
Thus far my analysis has been limited to the individual human being and the 
biological determination of her actions. But many see this limitation as a concep-
tual barrier when asking why a biologically-determined human being gives her 
actions certain social forms and creates (or plays her part in creating) institu-
tions controlling her own behaviour. (‘Institution’, in this context, means a sys-
tem of rules creating a certain social ordering. Institutions can be either formal 
or informal.) Unlike behavioural biologists, who analyse the genetically-
determined realm of possibilities, I wish to investigate why human beings order 
their realm of possibilities in such a way as to create their socio-cultural worlds. 
Arnold Gehlen was one of the first philosophers to arrive at such an analysis. 
His starting point is the human being as a biological creature, but he arrives at a 
social philosophy and a theory of institutions. He does not, however, begin with 
the rich biological realm of possibilities, but rather focuses on the shortcomings 
and limits of human nature. He describes the human being as an “undetermined 
animal” (referring to a formulation by Nietzsche). This “undetermined animal” 
has many shortcomings, since there are no controlling instincts or stable behav-
ioural patterns in its nature. Even though his analysis is in many ways outdated 
(as demonstrated above) it is still worth taking a look on Gehlen’s explanation of 
complex social structures. According to Gehlen, social institutions compensate 
for the shortcomings of natural instincts. They unburden the human being by 
giving him stability and control of his actions. Gehlen distinguishes three ways 
in which the socio-cultural world (first and foremost the institutions) is influ-
enced and affected by natural human dispositions: 
                                                          
28 One exception may be the — even less plausible — thesis that the human is completely free 
and there are no explanations for frequent behavioural patterns at all. 
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(i) The lack of other behavioural controls makes it necessary for human be-
ings to create unburdening institutions. 
(ii) Even if dispositions do not entirely control the human being, these in-
stincts still guide her actions in general directions (for example, towards inges-
tion). Institutions are to be understood as “forms of overcoming life-important 
tasks or circumstances”, since, for example, “reproduction or defence or inges-
tion require a regulated and continuous cooperation.”29 
(iii) Gehlen also claims that institutions arise during a process of develop-
ment. They are not the result of any conscious plan but the result of the un-
planned action of many individuals. “The living together of humans is stabilised 
in forms of orderings and rules, which come into existence just by themselves. 
One has to look for their steering mechanism within the area of instincts, but 
never in the rational calculation of ends.” 30 
About the process of democratisation, Gehlen claims that this has its own 
dynamic and does not follow any sociological rationale: “The democratic form of 
government for example is adopted by many peoples like the European way of 
clothing.”31  
We might present two general objections to Gehlen’s thesis. Firstly, his the-
ory of institutions is too neutral as to question of their validity and justification. 
He explains institutions more or less purely functionally in terms of a stabilising 
power. But whether an institution, first and foremost the important formal insti-
tutions within law and politics, are philosophically legitimated is not an interest-
ing question for Gehlen. Secondly, Gehlen does not reflect whether and how the 
individual institutions are involved in a selective competition with one another. 
He does not say whether a non-biological evolution within the socio-cultural 
frame is possible or not. Gehlen does not think in a sufficiently evolutionary 
way. He considers the functionality of institutions but seems not to care about 
their variation or selection. This is a rather ‘thin’ understanding of Darwinism. 
It is, of course, a very evolutionary way of thinking to assume that a phenome-
non has an advantageous property. For, according to evolutionary theory, prop-
erties are functional adaptations (at least in general; there are some exceptions, 
such as the ‘genetic drift’). This is, however, only a conclusion drawn from Dar-
winism and not a central tenet of Darwinism itself. Thirdly, Gehlen’s starting 
point conflicts with the insights of modern evolutionary biology. It is hard to see 
how his assumption, that human beings are deficient (“Mängelwesen”), holds 
when we obviously have highly specialised behavioural dispositions.32 Further-
                                                          
29 Gehlen 1961, 71. 
30 Gehlen 1969, 95. 
31 Gehlen 1964, 91. 
32 Gehlen argues against this that the possibilities human beings have is so-to-say the ‘flipside’ 
of an incomplete being and he is contrasting human imagination with rationality. See Gehlen 
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more, the assumption of deficiency contradicts the logic of evolutionary thought. 
For the human being was – at a certain point in time – a successfully selected 
primate. She must, then, have been well adapted. (The compensation of physical 
shortcomings via cultural achievement is a phenomenon which occurs much later 
in history and cannot be an explanation for the positive selection of Homo 
sapiens over other hominidae). 
I wish now to focus on some other attempts of relating the biological to the 
socio-cultural. In his studies of ancient religions Walter Burkert (1996) raises the 
question of the biological roots of our symbolic culture (religion is a good exam-
ple of such culture). Like Gehlen, Burkert sees religion as a cultural phenomenon 
which guides human action and gives its adherents orientation. It is therefore a 
functional institution. Burkert does not see religion as a compensation for our 
natural shortcomings, but understands it as a consequence of biological skills. 
Thus he conforms to the widely accepted opinion that human beings have many 
dispositions which allow for a wide range of realisation. 
But what is meant by a disposition towards religion? Burkert claims that it 
is an extension of the cultural framework created by the ability to communicate 
in a language. “Parallel to language, religion too, as an effective means of most 
serious communication, can be hypothesized to have arisen at a certain stage in 
prehistory as a competitive act, a way of gaining an advantage over those who 
did not take part in it.”33 That language has a biological foundation is not only 
obvious because of its universality, it can also be shown by reference to the very 
special physiological apparatus needed for vocalization. According to Burkert, 
one must assume a combined evolution of the biological conditions for language 
and language itself. One cannot separate nature from culture here, since lan-
guage is a so-called hybrid phenomenon in which nature and culture are inter-
twined. Language allowed early human beings not only to communicate, but 
also to create a common linguistic world of meaning which gave them guidance 
and orientation. 
But in what way is religion an adaptation? Although Burkert (1996) admits 
that a detailed explanation of its development and selective advantages remains 
part of the inaccessible pre-history of humankind, one can make educated 
guesses as to how religion contributed to evolutionary fitness. 
One factor is the orientation religions (and other institutions) provide. In a 
complex environment religions offered categories for interpretation which helped 
to order and structure the natural world. Burkert refers here to Niklas 
Luhmann’s thesis that religion allows for a “reduction of complexity”, and adds 
that religion gives “orientation within a meaningful cosmos for those who feel 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
1940. 
33 Burkert 1996, 19. 
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helpless vis-à-vis infinite complexity.”34 Religion helps to orientate the individ-
ual both in a theoretical and a practical way. It offers sense and gives practical 
solutions to difficult problems. Its offers are universal since religion broaches all 
topics affecting human life: elementary needs (such as hunger and thirst), ele-
mentary actions (such as giving and receiving), special experiences (such as 
death), and emotions (such as fear and happiness). Religion thus gives the hu-
man being a certain distance from these phenomena. Religious reference to 
trans-empirical principles makes it easier to deal with difficult situations. Ac-
cording to Burkert, all this contributed to human evolutionary fitness. Another 
factor is the motivating power of religion: it can channel and encourage particular 
behaviours. Rituals encourage continuous repetition of certain behaviours.35 Re-
ligion motivates by enduing reality with transcendental seriousness. It integrates 
fear and hope, and events and actions, into an ordered moral and metaphysical 
scheme.36 
Both Gehlen and Burkert treat institutions as functional features of the hu-
man being. But Burkert understands the human being from the perspective of 
her dispositions (and possibilities) rather than from the perspective of her short-
comings. He also assumes that the human institutions and the nexus of indi-
viduals in community offer a higher evolutionary fitness than that which can be 
attained by individuals functioning alone. He therefore concludes there must 
have been positive selection for this combination. Human beings without reli-
gious disposition, and therefore without its institutional manifestation (as, for 
example, the Neanderthal) appear to have vanished. But Burkert does not ad-
dress the question as to whether there is competition among institutions and 
therefore a (Darwinian) evolution of institutions.37 His primary goal is to demon-
strate how culture - and especially religion - builds upon biological dispositions 
and how it reacts to these dispositions. 38 
 
2.4. The Natural Framework of Cultural Developments  
 
The above authors attempt to connect the socio-cultural and the biological using 
the individual human creature as a starting point. Other authors begin by look-
ing at collectives. One can see how some societies and cultures are influenced by 
natural (but non-human) circumstances: by, for example, the characteristics of a 
                                                          
34 Burkert 1996, 26. 
35 Cf. Burkert 1996, 44. 
36 Cf. Burkert 196, 47. 
37 He distinguishes bigger developmental steps, for example from a primarily oral towards a 
written culture and religion. See Burkert, 1996, 214ff. But he does not say whether this has to 
be seen as an evolutionary process of selection. 
38 Cf. Burkert 1996, 36. 
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landscape, the climate, or the local flora and fauna of a region. Such observation 
has been used in political philosophy, in Montesquieu’s De L’Esprit des Lois 
(1748). He sees, for example, a connection between the climate of a region and its 
legal system. However, his speculations remain largely unjustified. The same is 
true of Ellsworth Hunnington’s attempts in Climate and Civilisation (1915), in 
which he proposes maps of “climatic energy” which lead to certain cultural de-
velopments. 
Jared Diamond’s arguments are more convincing. By reference to certain 
environmental parameters he explains evolutionary scenarios according to which 
the members of a tribe either died out, became hunters and gatherers, or created 
complexly organised states.39 In Guns, Germs and Steel. The Fate of Human Socie-
ties (1997), he identifies four natural factors which have played a decisive role in 
the development of human cultures over the last 13,000 years. 
1) He points us to the richness of regions with wild plants and animals which 
could be domesticated.  Only where there is enough richness of this kind, is there 
the possibility of agriculture. Agriculture and the nutrition surplus which is al-
lows enable both the specialisation of professions (there can be non-agricultural 
professions) and the growth of population.40 
2) Diamond also refers to the agricultural circumstances which allow the 
“diffusion and migration” of innovation. The Eurasian regions benefitted from 
their east-west orientation, which allowed such exchange. With its east-west 
axis, it is not divided by impassable seas or mountains (obstacles for the ex-
change of plants, animals, and technical innovation). Moreover, useful plants 
(such as the pea) and domestic animals (such as the chicken) could flourish in all 
areas of this region because, by virtue of its east-west orientation, it presents 
much the same climate within its latitudinal boundaries. This not the case for 
North America, for example, because of its north-south orientation.41 
3) The relative propinquity or isolation of continents from each other is an-
other significant factor according to Diamond. Relatively isolated continents, 
such as America, did not profit from the innovations of societies on other conti-
nents, whereas Africa’s relative proximity to Eurasia allowed Africans some con-
tact with some Eurasian invention. 
4) The size of habitable area and population are also important. A higher 
population is an advantage: the more people, thus the more creative people – 
and the more ideas and innovations. China, for example, has had more human 
resources than New Guinea by virtue of its large population. It is, however, an 
advantage if the geographical circumstances allow for a number of rivalling and 
                                                          
 39 Diamond 1997, 501f.  
40 Diamond 1997 , 502. 
 41 Diamond 1997, 208-230. 
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competing societies within a limited space. Diamond sees this as one of the main 
reasons for the swift political rise of Europe (and for the decline of the techni-
cally more developed China). Fragmentation into several small states (in Europe 
facilitated by a geography featuring many islands, peninsulas, seas, and moun-
tains) creates, according to Diamond, high innovation pressure. Societies had to 
choose between decline, innovation, or the rapid acquisition of the innovations of 
other cultures (in, for example, the field of weaponry).42 
In sum, Diamond focuses on the natural in human history, and seeks to shed 
light on causal interrelations.43 His book has been accused of defending a kind of 
determinism. He refutes this by pointing out that human creativity is also a 
condition of development. But he looks upon individual achievements with the 
eyes of a natural scientist. Why were there so many technological developments 
in Europe when time seemed to have stopped in Tasmania? For Diamond, the 
difference lies not in any special talents Europeans may have, but rather in the 
difference of environmental and cultural conditions.44 
But why is Diamond’s history of the natural sciences interesting for political 
philosophy? It is because of the possibility of applying his reconstruction of de-
velopment to contemporary societies in such a way that we might not only pre-
dict their future, but perhaps also be able to direct and influence that future.  
Diamond himself explores this in his Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or 
Succeed (2005) in which he analyses the conditions for the decline of cultures. In 
addition to social factors (such as warfare), Diamond identifies some natural cir-
cumstances which have contemporary relevance, notably the lack of resources 
caused by unsustainable methods of dealing with the environment and natural 
commodities. One need only consider the clearing of whole regions of forest in 
North Africa, which has destroyed the livelihoods of the population. Diamond 
accords due respect to human beings and their freedom by claiming that these 
environmental changes are not inescapable facts of history. Some of these cir-
cumstances are caused by human short-sightedness. Some circumstances are 
natural events to which humans beings did not react appropriately in good time. 
He concludes that it is the attitude and flexibility of cultures which determines 
whether or not natural circumstances lead to decline (as the work’s subtitle im-
plies). Cultures must be prepared to modify their behaviours and values if they 
are to react successfully to existential threats in a changing environment. Oth-
erwise, they will be negatively selected. 
 
                                                          
 42 Diamond 1997, 503. 
 43 Diamond 1997, 506. 
44 This reinforces the objection of determinism since Diamond stresses over and over that 
natural factors are the “deeper causes” for the critical empiric line of thought in the Greek-
Jewish-Christian tradition which finally lead to the rise of Europe. Cf. Diamond 1997, 507. 
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2.5. The Darwinian Evolution of Cultures 
 
Is it merely a metaphor to speak of the “natural selection” and “evolution” of 
cultures or of elements of a culture, such as institutions? Not necessarily, since 
Darwin’s explanation for the development of species can theoretically be applied 
in many fields. With its concepts of variation, inheritance, and selection, Dar-
win’s theory can explain the development of very different phenomena. It ap-
pears to be necessary that replicating entities which are all dependent on limited 
resources compete with each other. Also it appears to be necessary that the pass-
ing on of properties is relevant to the survival of any such entity.45 Thus evolu-
tion can take place even where the replicating units are not DNA helices so long 
as the relevant characteristics of a competition exist. Darwin himself attempted 
to explain the development of language using the concept selection. More re-
cently we have seen evolutionary models for the development of creative 
thought and cultural traditions (D. Campbell), for the development of scientific 
theories (S. Toulmin), the distribution of computer viruses via the internet (S. 
Blackmore), and for the way our immune system works (C. Plotkin).46 In all 
these cases, analysis in terms of replicating entities competing for resources 
proves fruitful. The entity which prevails in the long run is the one which exhib-
its the most useful properties – properties handed down to it by its parent or 
predecessor entity.47 Toulmin, for example, argues that some theories prevail 
over others because of their greater explanatory and integrative power, and are 
thus handed down (replicated) more than less efficient theories (which finally 
vanish). 
Daniel Dennett usefully talks about the “substrate neutrality” of the princi-
ple of selection.48 If one accepts this idea it makes sense to ask to what extent 
cultures and institutions exhibit Darwinian selection processes — independently 
of the question regarding their biological roots or the consequences for the bio-
logical fitness of human beings. Very much in this sense, already Darwin’s con-
temporary Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) distinguished three stages of the evolu-
tionary process: an “inorganic” evolution of space and earth, an “organic” evolu-
tion of living creatures, and finally a “superorganic” evolution which includes 
the development of social structures including moral frameworks. (Arnold 
Gehlen simply ignored this possibility, and Walter Burkert did not analyse it in 
any depth — despite the fact that it has prima facie plausibility and had been 
                                                          
45 See Christian Illies 2005. In this paper I try to give reasons why this insight is necessary. 
46 Campbell 1960; Toulmin 1972; Blackmore 1999, 55f.; Plotkin 1993. 
47 There are also borderline cases in which a property is selected without being “inheritable.” 
But this does not lead to evolution. If the “better fitting” properties are re-acquired in the new 
generation, there is only the same selection process taking place in every generation. 
48 Dennett 1996, 82, 353, 398, 430. 
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mooted since the 19th century).49 
Let us consider a recent example: the theory of the development of institu-
tions by Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992). Hayek sees institutions and 
other cultural artefacts as existing in evolutionary competition. He assumes that 
human beings need rules and, therefore, always follow them.50 But human reason 
is too limited to do justice to the complexity of action, especially because an in-
dividual cannot well estimate the consequences of her actions (and inactions). 
Rules are helpful, according to Hayek, to overcome this constitutional lack of 
knowledge. They reduce complexity and limit the logical space of all related cir-
cumstances only to the ones which are possibly relevant.51 For Hayek, systems of 
rules, and institutions, represent accumulations of historical experiences and the 
knowledge of a culture. They provide standard solutions for complex decisions 
and show the individual what she should (and could do). Language is the deci-
sive condition for creating, mediating, and adopting such systems of rules, be-
cause only language allows us to store such rules and to pass them on to younger 
generations. This process intensified with the advent of written language in later 
human history. Hayek’s concept of the system of rules applies both to the per-
sonal and the social realm of human behaviour: how, for example, to plan my 
own day and how to greet other people. The rules can be more formal or less 
formal. Rules of jurisdiction (laws) are, for example, very precisely articulated, 
whereas moral rules (ethical norms) are often rather informal.  
Regarding the historical development of systems of rules and institutions, 
Hayek uses the three Darwinian concepts of variation, inheritance, and selec-
tion. Variation happens whenever there is an innovation: a new rule or a new 
course of action which deviates from tradition. It can be introduced by a creative 
act, but also by mistake — as, for example, when one misinterprets an old rule. 
After that, selection takes place.52 Whether a new rule or convention for social 
interaction within a group will be selected or not depends on how advantageous 
following it might be for the individual. Advantageous rules will be adopted, 
whereas disadvantageous rules will be ignored – and finally die out. One might 
speak of a process of “trial and error.” Thus there will be adaptations to the past 
                                                          
49 Hodgson (2004) discusses the early attempts that apply Darwinism to social phenomena. 
50 von Hayek 1996, 22. A recently often discussed example for an evolutionary theory of cul-
ture is Dawkins’s memetics. Memetics understand all cultural phenomena (ideas, melodies, 
pottery, institutions, hallucination etc.) as “memes,” i.e. cultural units that show similar be-
haviour in the “selection chamber” of culture as genes do in the biological room. According to 
memetics, a meme is to be selected because understanding humans pick it up and reproduce it 
— and it fits well into the landscape of memes.(See Blackmore 1999). 
51 von Hayek 1994, 171. This comes pretty close to Gehlen’s and Burkert’s view that institu-
tions are necessary for orientation. 
52 von Hayek 1994, 157f. 
CHRISTIAN ILLIES 
648 
 
experience, which are a result of the selective elimination of less appropriate be-
haviour.53 Hayek seems to assume that selection takes place both within a group 
and between different groups. In the latter case, an element of biological evolu-
tion comes into place: groups with less advantageous rules will be also physically 
dominated or eliminated by the other groups. Hayek identifies the mechanism of 
inheritance as the imitation of rules. Advantageous innovations and useful rules 
will be followed by others. An important part of the mechanism of inheritance, 
according to Hayek, is language-acquisition since language assumes a meta-
physic of classifications and relations. In learning a language, one adopts a way 
of viewing, ordering, and acting within the world.54  
According to Hayek, knowledge is accumulated during a long evolutionary 
process in institutions, (i.e. cultural traditions and habits) but also in language 
and artefacts. The individual uses this corporate knowledge by following the in-
stitutions, by learning a language, or by using a tool. Even if she is not aware of 
it, she cumulatively incorporates experience.55 Understood in this way, cultural 
evolution is a process of social learning, in which the knowledge of whole genera-
tions is collected and passed on to provide efficient solutions to problems experi-
enced. All in all, Hayek sees this process as something positive. The invisible 
hand of selection leads to an accumulation of useful experiences – if this evolu-
tion is not interfered with. State-directed economies and un-free societies experi-
ence negative consequences from interference since positive development is 
grounded in the freedom and unpredictability of human actions.56 Consciously 
chosen rules can never produce the same wealth of knowledge and experience 
that unconscious processes of development bring about. Von Hayek therefore 
rejects wide-scale changes of social institutions but grants that small reforms 
may be beneficial to individual members of society. 
But is this inconsistent with a Darwinian analysis of institutions, wherein 
the institutions are seen to develop by a purely mechanical selection process? No. 
It is not a Darwinian tenet that the cause of variation is blind — only that selec-
tion is. So it is plausible to assume that there will be competition between differ-
ent institutions – Independently of their origin – and the result of this competi-
tion is solely decided by the criterion of efficiency. Only efficiency determines 
which institutions, and with which properties, will last permanently and which 
will vanish, and when.57 Consciously chosen rules have no advantage over uncon-
                                                          
53 von Hayek 1991, 34. 
54 von Hayek 1973. 
55 von Hayek 1960, 43. 
56 von Hayek 1960, 50. 
57 Similar for the mechanism of inheritance: It was often argued that cultural inheritance of 
institutions were Lamarckian since it allows for the transfer of acquired properties. This is 
plausible, but stands in no contradiction to a Darwinian evolution of institutions since also 
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sciously evolved rules in the remorseless selection process. For Hayek, there is 
nothing to indicate that consciously chosen rules have any advantage over oth-
ers. Conscious interventions are one way of producing variation, but there are 
many others. A theory of the development of institutions which includes only 
those rules which have been consciously stipulated by human beings remains de-
ficient. According to von Hayek, only with the analytical tools of Darwinism can 
the long-term development of institutions be fully explained.58 
There may, however, be cases in which the development of institutions does 
not follow Darwinian principles. Such is Hayek’s diagnosis of state-directed 
economies mentioned above, but also of totalitarian societies in which natural 
selection is precluded by violence. According to Hayek, this scenario often leads 
to bad development, because the positive natural accumulation of experiences 
and improvement of institutions has not been allowed to take place. This danger 
is especially pronounced in a modern technically-advanced world because the 
state has enormous power at its disposal, and may choose not to leave room for 
spontaneity.59 Therefore, Hayek claims, it is a crucial responsibility of politics to 
be aware of this danger. Politics must fashion a framework of freedoms for the 
natural evolution of institutions, so that open evolutionary competition will be 
possible.60 But this fashioning of the framework of freedom, one might object, 
could require the conscious stipulation of rules after all.  
 
 
3. Convergence as Objective 
 
3.1. Evolutionary Sciences and the Justification of Normative Judgments 
 
The above approaches have in common that they seek natural explanations for 
specific social behaviour and cultural phenomena and for their development 
which are relevant to political philosophy (and to the political sciences in gen-
eral). Thus they are helpful in understanding our institutions, their history and 
function. But they cannot contribute to the justification of institutions, political 
ideals, or objectives. This accords with Hume’s law: that one cannot get from a 
descriptive ‘is’ to a prescriptive ‘ought’ without any additional normative argu-
ments.  
As early as 1903 George Edward Moore, in Principia Ethica, extended 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
here, variation, (blind) selection and inheritance (however it looks like) remain decisive. Dar-
win himself is Lamarckian regarding inheritance when he assumes in the the Origin of Species 
that acquired properties can be inherited. 
58 That is the line of argumentation in  Hodgson and Knudsen 2006. 
59 See von Hayek 1960, 50. 
60 See von Hayek 1976, 30. 
CHRISTIAN ILLIES 
650 
 
Hume’s law to the evolutionary sciences: there is no direct connection between 
the evolutionary ‘coming to be’ and the normative ‘ought.’ Darwinian evolution 
must be understood as a blind (i.e. not goal-oriented) process which does not im-
ply any ideal or any evaluation of its outcome. That is also the reason why 
Moore rejects all evolutionary ethics proposals. (And there is a corollary: It is 
impossible to use evolutionary sciences to argue successfully that all morality is 
an illusion. For if it could be shown by philosophical arguments that there actu-
ally are correct moral judgments, and one could not deny this by reference to 
natural sciences which are normatively blind.)61  
Of course, it is possible to claim that evolution selects “fitter” entities, but 
“fitter” is a functional description relative to context. A fitter entity has proper-
ties which grant it a higher reproduction rate under certain circumstances, but 
not the status of being of more value than other entities. Many parasites and vi-
ruses are very fit for their host environment, for example, but we do not accord 
them greater value than other life forms: in fact, we evaluate them negatively. 
“Never use the terms higher & lower”, Darwin himself advised, as a kind of 
warning against overlaying the descriptive with the normative.62 
Evolutionary explanations are not sufficient for normative judgments – at 
least not if one holds that normative judgments must be justified in the strict 
sense. This is the sense in which rational arguments are necessary to validate 
normative judgments — and only if they are rationally validated, are they valid 
and obligatory in virtue of a “legitimate legitimation”, as Manfred Wetzel puts 
it.63 This applies both to ethics and to political philosophy, if the latter claims to 
be able to make normative distinctions between institutions (such as forms of 
government) or if political philosophers formulate objectives for political action. 
To be sure, it is one of the most difficult of philosophical questions what kind of 
rational argument, or even what kind of methodology, would be sufficient for a 
normative justification in this area. But we do not, fortunately, have to answer 
it in this paper. For our purposes here, it is enough to say that the methodology 
of the evolutionary sciences cannot grant a “legitimate legitimation.” 
But why did it – and why does it still – appeal to many authors (such as 
Herbert Spencer, Edward O. Wilson and Richard Dawkins) to analyse norma-
tive ideals with evolutionary arguments? One reason is the present crisis in phi-
losophy regarding the rational justification of moral values. No single methodol-
ogy is commonly accepted. There is another reason: the particular interrelated-
ness of descriptive and normative judgments in biological anthropology. In addi-
tion to descriptive statements (statements about human dispositions and evolu-
                                                          
61 For a more detailed account, see Illies 2006, 225-235. 
62 Darwin wrote this in the margin of his copy of Vestiges of Creation by Robert Chambers, 
who postulated an evolutionary upward movement. See Di Gregorio 1990, 164f. 
63 “Kraft einer legitimen [sic] Legitimation als gültig und verbindlich“. See Wetzel 2004, 209. 
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tionary processes of development) and normative judgments (“ought sentences”) 
there are also evolutionary explanations of how human beings arrive at norma-
tive judgments – descriptive statements about whether and how human beings 
have dispositions for normative judgments. One obvious example of this is what 
David M. Buss calls “a thirst for justice”.64 Leda Cosmides and John Tooby take 
this as a basis for their claim that we have a genetic disposition to think in the 
category of social contract — that means in normative categories. But can this 
be a justification for the social contract? I would deny this with reference to 
Hume’s law. It is and always will be a descriptive statement to explain the bio-
logical causes which lie behind the giving of a normative judgment, and a nor-
mative judgment cannot follow from a descriptive statement. Let us look at an 
example. In 1848 there was a rock-blasting accident in which an iron rod was 
driven through the head of the American railroad construction worker named 
Phineas Gage. Much of Gage’s left frontal lobe was destroyed, but he somehow 
(to everyone’s surprise) survived this accident. But Gage was no longer the polite 
gentlemen he was before the accident: he turned very negative. Today, neurolo-
gists might explain in some detail why Gage gave only negative judgments about 
his fellow men after the accident happened. But the fact that neurobiologists 
could explain these normative judgements does not mean that they are justified. 
Explanations are simply not reasons.  
There might be a reason why evolutionary anthropology often confuses de-
scriptive and normative judgments. It seems to follow from our biological nature 
that we ask for a “legitimate legitimation” at all. It is a special characteristic of 
the human being that her complex brain allows her to stand at a linguistic dis-
tance from herself, and to consider herself free to choose between possible objec-
tives, wishes, and the satisfaction of various needs. Max Scheler pointed this out 
in his philosophical anthropology when he describes humans as capable of sup-
pressing his impulses. While animals must always say ‘yes’ to their needs and 
desire, we are able to say on occasion ‘no’ to our drives and impulses.65 
Standing at this distance, humans ask the universal ‘why’ question: we seek 
explanations for everything that exists, for good reasons for what we want to do, 
and for good reasons for what we ought to do. From this human characteristic 
arises the need for theoretical ordering and for practical orientation – two things 
Gehlen and Burkert identified (in different ways, of course) as the beginning of 
culture, politics, and religion. This human need culminates in the desire for a le-
gitimate legitimation. We are not satisfied with easy answers to the problem of 
justification.  
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3.2. Convergence as the Objective of Political Activity 
 
Political philosophy, if it acknowledges both the possibility of the normative and 
the existence of the inherent laws and processes in the world (made known to us 
by the empirical sciences), must fulfil the task of bringing about states of society 
where what is (normatively) best might become real. One part of this task might 
be the guaranteeing of universal human rights by positive law. The task itself 
may have to be spread over time in a somewhat complex way. For example, one 
might distinguish between what is possible at present, what is possible in the 
middle-term, and what is possible long-term (with the added complexity that 
present actions may increase or decrease the range of possible future actions). 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte adopted this methodology of political philosophy as the 
ground for his work Der geschlossene Handelsstaat (= the closed trading state). 
His idea can be easily identified by looking at the structure of the work: Fichte 
beings with the account and justification of an ideal (an institution of which he 
believes he can with good reason approve, i.e. the closed trading state). He then 
describes the reality of his time: he gives an analysis of actual commercial inter-
course. Finally he gives political recommendations as to how to implement the 
ideal in the real world.66 The implementation, then, is not a task of political phi-
losophy, but of actual politics.  
Political philosophy cannot, however, always distinguish between these as-
pects as clearly as Johann Gottlieb Fichte did. It is especially difficult in practice 
to define the boundaries between the justification of normative judgments on the 
one hand, and the task of making the normative actual on the other. Normative 
ideals are generally part of the basic cultural equipment of a historically devel-
oped society. Normative ideals are used in practice and are not, therefore, a part 
only of normative approaches, but also a part of descriptive approaches (even 
though these latter approaches cannot justify them). Furthermore, discourses of 
normative justification are also embedded in culture and can often be understood 
only in their proper contexts. Finally, one must distinguish the validity of nor-
mative ideals from their factual acknowledgement, and this in turn must be dis-
tinguished from actual compliance with these norms. The latter two are both 
parts of the descriptive world and it is therefore difficult (but important) to give 
a strict definition of them. It remains necessary —following Hume’s law — to 
distinguish the justification of normative ideals from the description of ideals 
people actually hold to. 
Not even the subtlest analysis of the world, knowledge of cultural contexts 
                                                          
66 This is equivalent to the ‘mixed syllogism’ already Aristotle used as a basic logical hypothe-
sis of applied ethics. Given a normative a priori premise and a descriptive a posteriori premise, 
one can infer a special normative statement that represents an application of the firstly men-
tioned ideal to the descriptively grasped part of reality. See Hösle 1999, 169. 
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and of the realities of the acknowledgement of ideals can lead to a legitimate le-
gitimation of normative ideals. But neither can a set of justified normative val-
ues lead to any good in the world. Even a perfect understanding of our norma-
tive ideals does not tell us how to implement them in the world: ideals without 
empirical data are empty; empirical data without ideals are blind. 
How are we to understand the relation between the justification of ideals 
and the gathering of empirical knowledge? One usually assumes a reflective equi-
librium between those two activities. The empirical sciences can be of use in aid-
ing the implementation of ideals. If we hold, for example, that the right to po-
litical participation is fundamental, we need to analyse a culture to know exactly 
about what is meant by political participation within that culture. Furthermore, 
motivation for empirical research often comes from relevant questions which 
have arisen from normative ideals. The ideal of political participation will, for 
example, focus our attention on possible mechanisms of manipulation; and these 
we must understand if we seek to protect human beings from themselves. The 
reflexive process is subtle. We begin with a rather general formalisation of the 
ideal, and might perhaps have only a limited relevant knowledge of the empirical 
world. During reflection, we sharpen that ideal, but also focus on the relevant 
aspects of the empirical world which will help us implement the ideal. Inspecting 
the empirical world might also lead us to a more in-depth critique of an ideal. If 
an ideal cannot be implemented, one should seriously question its legitimacy. 
Thus the reflective equilibrium between the normative and the descriptive ap-
proaches helps us make normative ideals substantial. An important consequence 
of this equilibrium is a certain dynamic within political philosophy: Normative 
judgments have only presumptive validity, since they must remain open for re-
vision and challenge by new objections which might become necessary in face of 
new empirical insights. The constantly varying contexts of a world in change 
should lead to constantly varying substantialisations of our ideals. But none of 
this entails that the justification of moral norms depends on social or cultural 
context – contrary to what the contextualists, for example, claim. 
What does it mean to implement normative ideals in the empirical world? 
We cannot work, especially in politics, with so simple a deduction as tells us only 
that the normative ideal should be applied or instantiated according to this or 
that circumstances. (One might imagine such a simple process of substantialisa-
tion only, perhaps, in the case of prohibitions.) Generally, one would have to fo-
cus on long-term processes of development of political structures and institutions 
towards a normative ideal. There are a number of reasons for this. Change often 
can only happen in a rather plodding way – via reform and not via revolution. 
Complex institutions, deeply-rooted traditions, and strong attitudes cannot be 
reformed quickly. Attempts to do so either fail completely or result in immense 
social costs (remember Gandhi’s attempt to abolish the caste system in India). 
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Often slow reform is the more efficient, and sometimes the only possible, way. 
Not everything is possible at every point of time. Normative ideals cannot be 
implemented directly in many cases, but only indirectly through changing a cer-
tain framework. The best way to fight poverty in a region could be, for example, 
the creation of a better education system. This is something we can learn from 
the evolutionary sciences: processes of development have their own logic. A pru-
dent political philosophy will accept this, but will also try to use this inherent 
logic to nudge evolution into the right direction.  
With other words, political philosophy is about the “convergence” of social 
developments and normative ideals. The normative ideal should, in the long 
term, become a naturally practiced ethical life within a culture. Only thus can 
the normative ideal become substantive in a permanent and stable way. It is the 
enduring insight of Hegel that morality becomes concrete only in the actual 
practice of the ethical life. We might add that such an ethical life must be ar-
rived at by evolutionary processes and must have proved itself through the proc-
ess of selection. Convergence is not only a first-order objective, but also a higher-
order ideal, an ideal ideal, as we might say, since it is the ideal way for ideals to 
become reality.  
 
3.3. The Natural Conditions of Convergence 
 
All actions, including political actions, take place within contextual frameworks 
of conditions. Without frameworks, there would be no options, and actions could 
neither be limited nor promoted. Political philosophy seeks to analyse and utilise 
these conditions. It is not, a priori, possible to reach impossibilities, and not 
therefore useful to aspire to the impossible. Therefore, political philosophy must 
strive for the best within a framework of limited possibilities. This might be 
achieved by changing the conditions, but if the conditions are immutable, one 
must choose or design institutions or actions which fit into the framework of 
immutable conditions and lead to optimal results, or at least to the best possible 
ones.  
But what consequences can we draw for political philosophy from the di-
verse natural conditions which determine our actions? By natural conditions I 
mean to include those created by both nature within ourselves and nature 
around us, and also the inherent logic of evolutionary development. If the exam-
ples of cultural explanation in Section 2 are sound, political philosophy could 
improve our society the better with them than without them. We will differenti-
ate four different aspects of this conditional framework which have been handed 
over to political philosophy by anthropology and the evolutionary sciences. 
Even though the distinctions are not sharp, the differentiation will prove useful. 
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(i) There are fundamental conditions, as we can learn from Diamond. Ignor-
ing them makes success impossible. Cultures should not, for example, be wasteful 
with their natural resources since they cannot survive without them. It is obvi-
ously not reasonable to expect human beings to act in a way which is impossible 
for them, and we do not need any specialised sciences to tell us what is impossi-
ble for us.  
More interesting are the areas where we could learn from anthropology what 
is almost impossible for us – areas where our genetically-disposed actions and 
emotions make things difficult for us. One example is our desire for social rank 
and respect of fellows. A society without social rank is not only hard to justify, 
but also unachievable. Attempts to achieve it, from the French Revolution to 
Communist experiments, have all failed and led to new ranking systems instead.  
But if one desires do deal wisely with what is almost impossible, one should 
still be critical towards what is alleged as impossible. One should distinguish be-
tween a disposition and its development and manifestation. In most cases, cer-
tain actions are impossible for human beings because their dispositions devel-
oped in a certain way, not because their dispositions preclude such actions in 
principle. One example is antagonistic behaviour. Whether it is possible for a 
human being to solve conflicts without aggression depends significantly on 
whether she experienced peaceful conflict solutions in her adolescence — and 
whether she is in general familiar with such peaceful solutions. To understand 
the convergence of human action with normative ideals, one must understand 
the human being as a creature of possibilities. And one way of doing that is to 
focus on moral education. 
 
(ii) Human beings have a natural constitution. This cannot be ignored. But 
more than that: one should make use of one’s natural constitution in order to 
reach normative objectives. If institutions make use of this constitution to steer 
impulses to act in a certain direction, they can implement ideals without using 
force. If it were possible to connect social ranks in a society to the achievement 
of politically desirable virtues, there would be a competition between citizens 
over their contribution to the common good. This is something Plato and Aris-
totle had in mind, and is certainly welcome from the perspective of modern po-
litical philosophy and practice.  
Liberalism in the 18th century had similar ideas. For the development of a 
liberal community one does not need a new kind of human being; rather all the 
shortcomings and weaknesses of human beings as they are could be useful in the 
attainment of this goal. This is what Kant had in mind when he called human 
beings the “crooked wood”. But being an optimist, Kant acts on the assumption 
that even evil (for example avaricious and egoistic) motives could have positive 
consequences. For Kant, nature is designed to make harmony spring from hu-
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man discord, even against the will of man.67 Competition is enough to erect the 
high house of a harmonic society by making use of the human weaknesses. Con-
temporary political philosophy does not necessarily share Kant’s optimism (that 
also influenced Hayek). But the main point still pertains: it should be on the po-
litical agenda that we use everything which motivates human beings to imple-
ment normative ideals, even our unsocial instincts. We should, therefore, also 
give prima facie unsocial motivations and dispositions a chance of expression in 
case they turn out to be useful in the long run. 
Anthropology can contribute to this by showing us which dispositions need 
to be controlled, and evolutionary sciences can show what inherent logic we have 
to deal with if we want to control them. Understanding this inherent logic does 
not entail trusting in a self-developing selection process which will reach a desir-
able outcome steered by an “invisible hand.” The bottom-line of evolutionary 
theory is that evolution is not goal-oriented. But evolution is compatible with the 
stipulation of goals,68 as Darwin made clear with reference to the breeding of 
domestic animals and useful plants (at beginning of his Origin of Species). If se-
lection is goal-oriented, by, for example, the breeding program of a cultivator, it 
may lead to the desired result.  
But now there are two conditions one has to consider if one wishes give a di-
rection to an evolutionary process. These are the last two aspects of the condi-
tional framework for political philosophy which one can infer from anthropology 
and the evolutionary sciences. Let us consider them. 
 
(iii) In an evolutionary process, after many generations, a property (or an 
entity having a property) will prevail over its competitors, only if that property 
or that entity is better fitted than its competitors for the conditions in which se-
lection takes place. “Prevailing” means to have more descendants in future gen-
erations than one’s competitors. This also applies to cases of non-biological enti-
ties which are in an evolutionary competition. It is important for the evolution-
ary success of an entity to have advantages over its competitors. 
How can we use this insight in a prudent way in order to control political 
developments? Well, we must design institutions that accord with the normative 
ideal in such a way that they could prevail over competing institutions. To use an 
expression of game theory: Institutions have to be “evolutionary stable strate-
gies.” That means that a strategy (behavioural rules, institutions, etc.) must be 
more useful for the relevant actors than any other potential strategy. We should, 
for example, ask how to design democracy in such a way that it is evolutionary 
stable within our society and cannot be annulled by extremist tendencies. To 
                                                          
67 Kant 1776, 143. 
68 See Illies 2006, 81-90. 
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reach such a goal, prohibiting extremist parties and forbidding the self-
disempowerment of the democratic parliament are wise means.  
 
(iv)The conditions of selection itself must also be given attention. What 
property or entity prevails in the long run depends both on the relevant property 
or entities and on the selective circumstances. To reach convergence, one should 
therefore modify the conditions of selection in accordance with the objective. 
Robert Axelrod, for example, argues that children have to be educated in small 
groups since only in those conditions can a reciprocal altruism develop. (It is in 
these conditions that altruism becomes the prevalent strategy, and children can 
then develop the habit of cooperation). Any society needs, in order to survive, a 
deeply rooted altruism tying its members together. In contrast, schools without 
stable classes provide unfavourable selection conditions for altruistic strategies. 
Prudent politics should therefore avoid them as much as possible, and promote 
instead small, stable classes.  
In this way, political philosophy can make a productive use of empirical 
data coming from anthropology and biological sciences: Politicians must analyse 
in a very concrete fashion, for each kind of circumstances, what behaviour and 
what institutions are generated by and compatible with given environmental 
conditions and political constellations. Such an analysis will heavily rely on con-
siderations concerning what behaviours and what institutions were selected in 
the past. Even if we are only at the beginning of our attempt to understand the 
complex interrelation between nature (and its evolution) and cultural phenom-
ena, such investigations promise to offer new insights into our practical prob-
lems. Political philosophy has to integrate the insights of anthropology and evo-
lutionary sciences in an increasingly creative and constructive way, in order to 
pursue the goal of convergence between ideal and reality.  
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